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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A hypothetical case with the constituent elements of a typical
crime set forth might be helpful in indicating where the line is
to be drawn. A and B are next-door neighbors and bitter enemies.
A is sitting in his living room reading the evening paper and
brooding over the grudge he bears his neighbor. He decides to kill
B, but he has no gun in the house, and no place is open where he
can buy a gun at that hour. Next morning A goes down town
and purchases a gun and cartridges, putting both in his pocket.
Both intent and the means of executing that intent are now present,
but his acts do not yet constitute an attempt. When evening has
come, and B is out upon his lawn, A goes out upon his own lawn,
his hand grasping the gun concealed in his pocket. Probably no
attempt could yet be made out. A takes the gun from the pocket
of his coat and points it at B-at this point the attempt is com-
plete. In this case A's intent was fully formed while he sat
brooding over his grudge, and even at this point he was a menace
to society. The law, however, will take no action until his intent
has crystallized into dynamic manifestation.
It is submitted that the better rule-the rule wich is latent in
the cases cited-is that preparation for a crime becomes a crime
when the acts of the defendant are so unequivocal in nature that
the defendant's intent to commit the crime is shown beyond reason-
able doubt. Under this rule, proximity to the crime itself would
not be the decisive factor except to the extent that proximity would
bear upon the question of intent. This rule would permit a greater
flexibility of administration, and this, in turn, would enable courts
and juries more effectively to guard against socially dangerous
individuals.
LEo OxLzEy
IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF IMPRISONMENT
BY THE PLAINTIFF A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN
FALSE IMPRISONMENT?
"False imprisonment has been said to be the unlawful restraint
by one person of the physical liberty of another."' Prosser says
that it is an invasion of an interest, which is in a sense mental,
resembling the apprehension of contact in the assault cases. There-
fore, if one incloses another within definitive bounds without just
cause and without the consent of the other, he is liable for false
im risonment.
It is contended'by the text-writers that the better view is that
the plaintiff must have actual knowledge, at the time, of the
fact that he as imprisoned before he can maintain an action.3
122 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, sec. 2.
"PRossER,TORTS (1941) 68.
'Ibid.
STUDENT NOTES
Harper goes so far as to say that one cannot be imprisoned unless
he knows about it. The Restatement of Torts is very clear in
stating that the plaintiff must have actual knowledge of the
imprisonment at the time it occurred7 There is a notable dearth
of cases on the subject. As far as can be found no case in
Kentucky has been decided on the point.
The leading English case on the subject is Herring v. Boyle.,
In that case, the plaintiff, an infant, was sent to the defendant's
boarding school. Later the child's mother requested that the boy
accompany her home. The defendant refused because a certain
amount of the tuition was overdue. This request and refusal was
not known to the boy at the time. The court affirmed a non-suit,
because the plaintiff did not know that he was being restrained.
This case refused to follow the principle laid down in the later
case, Meerzng v. Grahame-White Avmation Company. In the latter
case the plaintiff was an adult. Atkin, L. J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, said that in his opinion, if one were actually
imprisoned it was unnecessary to consider whether he knew
about it or not!I
There are two American cases which seem1 to be contra to
the view taken by the text writers. In Barker v. Washburn,' a
committee for an idiot was allowed to prosecute an action for the
false imprisonment of the idiot. In Commonwealth v Nickerson.'
the guardian of a child of nine years of age was allowed to main-
tam an action for the child's false inprisonment. Both in Herring
v. Boyle and in the American cases the person imprisoned is pre-
sumed to be incapable of consent and is also deemed not to have
the capacity for effective will. It is submitted, therefore, that
Herring v. Boyle is inadequate as a precedent to establish the
principle of the necessity of the plaintiff's knowledge?,
It has been stated that false imprisonment must include some
element of assault.? If that be true, it would seem to sustain
'HARPER, TORTS (1933) sec. 21.
R ESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1932) sec. 42.
-1 Cr. M. & R. 376 (Exch. 1834).
7122 L. T. R. 44 (1920). THURSTON AND SEAVEY, CASES ON TORTS
(1942) 36.
'Note (1920) 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 360. The. writer vigorously
criticizes Meermg v. Grahame-White, contending that the concept
of restraint is erroneous.
'200 N. Y. 280, 93 N. E. 958, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 159 (1911).
5 Allen 518 (Mass. 1862).
"The author cited in note 8, supra, at page 362, in criticizing
the Meermg case, says: "As indicated above this was not a case
of first impression in England, a directly contrary adjudication
having been rendered in the case of Herring v Boyle nearly a
century before."
" "False imprisonment is the illegal restraint of a person against
his will and generally includes an assault and battery and always
at least a techmcal assault." Hoffman v. Climc Hospital, 213 N. C.
669, 197 S. E. 161 (1938).
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the position that the interest invaded is mental and therefore the
plaintiff must suffer mental anguish at the time he is confined.
Disregarding the meaning of the vague term "technical assault,"
it is clear that if X is in a room and Y turns the key in the
door there may be false imprisonment, but there is certainly no
assault without something further. False imprisonment is not
so much an invasion of a mental interest in security as it is
of the right of free locomotion. The instant the key is turned in
the door rather than the moment of discovery is the point of
time when false imprisonment should begin.
The rule supported by the writers puts a premium on subter-
fuge. In other words, one may safely enclose another and
accomplish some end detrimental to him so long as he is clever
enough or lucky enough to hide that fact of imprisonment from
the one confined. X knows that Y will be called at a certain
time by a prospective employer. The employer needs the job
filled quickly. X also wants the job, so he induces Y, who is
always home at this time, to come to his home, where he locks
him in a room, making the excuse that they are likely to be
disturbed. Y's wife calls and X answers the phone and refuses
to let her tell Y about the job; Y does not discover the trick until
he returns home. He has no action for false imprisonment against
X under the rule supported by the text writers.
Such a view. is likely to produce bad social results. If the
common law is so zealous of personal freedom that it raises a
cause of action against a private person who arrests another in
good faith if in fact no felony has been committed, why should it
permit some one else, for no just cause, to confine another and be
free of liability so long as he can keep the fact of restraint from
the one ,onfined?
It is submitted that the rule, in its present form, is undesirable.
Should personal freedom and its social consequences be so lowly
regarded? Should the common law intrust to anyone such oppor-
tunity for interfering with another's right to free locomotion, or,
in fact, encourage it?
SCOTT REED
LIABILITY OF SUBLESSEE AND ASSIGNEE
TO OWNER FOR RENT
In Entroth Shoe Co. v. Johnsoie the plaintiff, owner, leased
a store for a term extending from February 1, 1929, to April 30,
1932. On February 25, 1920, the lessee leased a part of the
prermses to the defendpnt for the remainder of the term. Shortly
before February 1, 1931, the defendant abandoned the premises.
On October 1, 1931, the defendant settled with the lessee and secured
1260 Ky. 309, 85 S. W (2d) 686 (1935).
